Practical problems and obstacles to inflation targeting by Laurence H. Meyer
INFLATION TARGETS AND INFLATION
TARGETING
This distinction between inflation targets and
inflation targeting, first made in a speech in July 2001
while I was a member of the Board of Governors,
can perhaps be best understood in terms of a two-by-
two matrix (Table 1). Across the top, I identify two
types of inflation targets, one implicit (like the
United States today) and the other explicit (as in so-
called “inflation targeting” countries today). Down
the side I identify two forms of mandate that central
banks around the world operate under. These man-
dates are typically set by the legislatures. The United
States and Australia operate under a dual mandate,
according to which monetary policy is directed at
promoting both full employment and price stability,
with no priority expressed, and with the central bank
responsible for balancing these objectives in the
short run. Inflation-targeting countries generally
operate under hierarchical mandates, one in which
price stability is identified as the principal objective,
and central banks are restricted in pursuing other
objectives unless price stability has been achieved.
The United States has an implicit inflation target
and a dual mandate, the upper left. The United
Kingdom, Canada, and other so-called inflation-
targeting countries have an explicit inflation target
and a hierarchical mandate. They are in the lower
right. Australia has a dual mandate along with an
explicit inflation target. That is the combination I
am suggesting for the United States.
Lars Svensson always responds to my proposal
by telling me that my distinction between dual and
hierarchical mandates is too strict. In particular it
misses the evolution in practice around the world.
In general, inflation-targeting countries today have
moved away from the initially austere implemen-
tation, more in line with the spirit of a hierarchical
mandate, and have become flexible inflation target-
ers, close cousins of dual mandate central banks.




he number of conferences, papers, and
speeches on inflation targeting suggests a
growing interest in exploring whether and
in what way the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) should consider adopting an explicit numer-
ical objective for inflation. Because the devil is often
in the details, it is important to go beyond the gener-
al interest in this direction and to explore obstacles
to moving in the direction and, at the same time,
to begin to think about some practical problems
that would have to be resolved if such an approach
were to be implemented.
My point of departure is the conviction that, if
the FOMC were to adopt an explicit numerical
inflation target, the vision of the resulting regime
would have to fit both the political realities and the
basic approach to monetary policymaking in the
United States over the past decade. Indeed, the case
for adopting an explicit inflation target in the United
States is typically rationalized in terms of continuity
rather than change. That is, it is an attempt to ensure
continuity in the conduct of monetary policy, espe-
cially after the departure of Alan Greenspan, not to
be an instrument for changing the way in which
monetary policy has been conducted over the past
decade or two.
The key distinction essential for understanding
the regime that would be a good fit for the United
States is between inflation targets and inflation target-
ing. After explaining that distinction, I will offer my
view of the vision of the Greenspan FOMC and con-
sider the consistency of that vision with a regime
with an explicit numerical inflation target. Next I
consider the political climate for adopting an infla-
tion target and other potential obstacles. I will con-
clude with a consideration of implementation details,
as the choice is not ultimately between an explicit
and implicit target in principle, but between the
current practice and a specific alternative.
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There are two possibilities in connection with
that evolution. First, the language in the mandates
was intended to impose restrictions on the central
banks, restrictions that went beyond simply identify-
ing an explicit numerical inflation objective. So,
whatever you want to call inflation targeters, from
nutters to flexible inflation targeters, central banks
under a hierarchical mandate are going to behave
differently, specifically with less flexibility than in
the case of dual mandate central banks. It is of course
a topic for research, as to whether or not such differ-
ences can be identified in practice.
Second, what about the assessment that there
is no practical difference between flexible inflation
targeters operating under a hierarchical mandate
and dual mandate central banks? If this were the case,
the only difference between dual and hierarchical
mandate central banks is one of transparency. Dual
mandate central banks are transparent about their
objectives and flexible inflation targeters are not.
To allow for this possibility, I have shown a second
two-by-two matrix, what I call my Lars Svensson
model.
The transparency with respect to the stabiliza-
tion objective for monetary policy is itself a fascinat-
ing subject. Historically, central bankers, unlike
members of the Congress, have been embarrassed
to admit they care about anything other than price
stability or conduct monetary policy for any other
purpose. Bob McTeer has perhaps said it best when
he reminded the Committee that “only hawks go to
central bank heaven.” Even in the United States, it
is much easier to find quotes from FOMC members
about the importance of price stability than about
the responsibility of monetary policymakers for
damping fluctuations in output around full employ-
ment. You all, I expect, recall the pillorying Alan
Blinder received when he noted at the Jackson Hole
conference in August 1994 that monetary policy-
makers should keep an eye on the unemployment
rate as well as on inflation.
This also reminds me of an incident at my very
first Jackson Hole conference as a member of the
Board in August 1996. Two of the leading central
bankers in the world took me aside to help educate
me about how to conduct myself so I would be
viewed as an upstanding central bank citizen. They
offered me the very same advice. Good central
bankers never admit they pursue stabilization policy.
Such an admission would reduce the confidence of
the public in your commitment to price stability and
therefore undermine your credibility and effective-
ness as a monetary policymaker. I responded that I
appreciated the advice, especially from such distin-
guished central bankers, but that it left me a bit
confused. They seemed to be telling me that the
way to build credibility was to lie, specifically about
how I understood the objectives and how I intended
to conduct monetary policy. I never followed their
advice and indeed tried to educate the public about
the importance of the dual mandate.
This distinction between dual and hierarchical
mandates is central to the issue of the obstacles to
moving to an explicit numerical inflation target in the
United States and to the goal of designing a regime
that provides for continuity with the vision of mone-
tary policy as practiced in the United States for at
least the past decade or two. Indeed, many of those
who vigorously oppose inflation targets do so because
they identify that practice with the hierarchical
mandates and a down-weighting of responsibility
of the central bank for promoting full employment.
One caveat is in order here. There are important
differences between the full employment and price
stability objectives, and I do not want to minimize
or disregard these differences, because they are
central to good practice for central banks. These
differences may indeed be the origin for hierarchical
mandates, though I expect the origin has more to do
with the disappointing experience with monetary
policy and inflation before the inflation-targeting
regimes were adopted. 
First, a central bank, over some appropriate
intermediate term, can achieve an inflation target,
with a significant degree of precision. It has a choice
as to whether that target should be 2 percent or 3
percent or some other number. In a word, with
respect to inflation, the buck literally does stop at
the central bank. Central banks have less influence
over the short-run path of output and employment,
but, nevertheless, at the margin, can damp move-
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Second, with respect to an inflation target, central
banks know where they want to go. Notwithstanding
biases and measurement issues, the central bank
can pick a target and get there. Unfortunately, the
same cannot be said for the full employment objec-
tive. We do not know exactly where it is at a given
moment or where it may be in the future. It is, of
course, not really as murky as that characterization
suggests, but we have only an estimate of the non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU)
and of potential output, and we have to update that
estimate over time, in part using information based
on the experience with inflation. This measurement
uncertainty does not mean that a central bank
should not pursue its estimate of full employment,
but it does imply that that pursuit has to be different
in some subtle ways from the way it pursues its infla-
tion objective. In particular, central banks cannot
simply aim for a particular unemployment rate and
decide after the fact if it is really sustainable. Rather,
monetary policymakers have to be prepared to move
aggressively into the range of the estimate of full
employment and then perhaps move more gingerly
toward the estimate, watching each step along the
way for feedback as to whether it has gone far
enough or has overshot.
THE VISION OF GREENSPAN
My premise is that the goal of any change with
respect to the inflation target is one designed to
preserve and even ensure continuity in the way
monetary policy has been conducted under the
Greenspan FOMC. I therefore set out my vision of
that approach, identifying the three principles that,
in my view, have guided practice.
1.Build a reputation for a commitment to
price stability in order to anchor inflation
expectations. While an inflation target can
in principle contribute to this end, inflation
expectations, in practice, are based more on
performance than promise. Hence, outcomes
are more important than rhetoric. Therefore,
the first principle is that monetary policy
should be conducted to move the inflation rate
over time to a low, stable rate (the FOMC’s
implicit inflation target) and then to maintain
it close to that rate, with allowances for normal
cyclical variation. I thus identify the FOMC
under Greenspan as an implicit inflation 
targeter.
2. Monetary policymakers should aggressively
respond to demand shocks that would
otherwise move output and employment
from their full employment levels, with
appropriate consideration for prevailing
and prospective inflation rates. Well-
anchored inflation expectations provide
monetary policymakers increased freedom
to adjust policy in the shorter run to damp
movements in output relative to potential,
without concern that such aggressive use of
stabilization policy could destabilize inflation
expectations. There is a corollary to the 
second principle. The anchoring of inflation
expectations itself makes the economy more
stable, reducing the effect on overall inflation
of adverse supply shocks and reducing the
instability that arises when the economy is
allowed to overheat and inflation rises above
the implicit inflation target, to be reversed
later on. 
3.Monetary policymakers should be flexible
and pragmatic in the conduct of monetary
policy. Policy rules can provide useful guid-
ance to monetary policymakers, but policy-
makers’ judgment will be essential in
responding to unique shocks or circumstances
and to making policy when the uncertainty
about the model, parameters, or the measure-
ment of key variables becomes especially
large.
The Chairman, in my view, also believes that low,
stable inflation contributes to strong productivity
growth and hence to a higher maximum sustainable
rate of economic growth. This provides still another
reason why maintaining low stable inflation has
significant payoffs for economic performance. I
expect that the other members of the FOMC have
less faith in this principle than the Chairman.
What is unique about the Greenspan vision are
the synergies presumed between the two objectives
for monetary policy—price stability and damping
fluctuations around full employment—as well as
between price stability and achieving maximum
sustainable growth. What is also unique is that the
Chairman, based on this vision, is generally viewed
as being a hawk when it comes to containing infla-
tion and a dove when it comes to quickly providing
support for a weakening economy. That is a remark-
able combination, politically as well as economically,
and one that the FOMC presumably would not want




THE POLITICS OF INFLATION TARGETS
The Congress sets the objectives for monetary
policy, just as legislatures typically do in the case of
other central banks around the world. The Greenspan
vision, if not rhetoric, is, in my view, very much in
sync with the Congressional mandate. 
There is, in my opinion, no chance that the
Congress would accept a regime with a hierarchical
mandate that raised the profile of price stability
and diminished the responsibility of the FOMC for
stabilization policy. It is true that there have been
specific bills introduced in the Congress that would
have moved the Fed in this direction. But those bills
reflected a minority position, indeed a very small
minority position, and the overwhelming majority of
the Congress would have rejected such an approach.
The only exception would be if there was a period
in which monetary policy in the United States was
not appropriately disciplined and inflation rose to
very high levels. The Congress might then impose a
more restrictive mandate. And that is the historical
experience that preceded the implementation of
many of the inflation-targeting regimes around the
world.
Nevertheless, there could be an obstacle in
achieving a consensus with the Congress about any
change in the conduct of monetary policy. The
greater danger is that the Congress would want to
balance an explicit target for inflation with an explicit
target for full employment. And, for the reasons
developed above—specifically, we do not know pre-
cisely the level of the NAIRU or potential output,
and our estimates of these indicators of full employ-
ment change over time—the FOMC could not accept
an explicit numerical target for inflation if it were
bundled with an explicit target for full employment.
This is perhaps the most important reason why
consultations with the Congress are so important
as a part of any interest of the FOMC in moving in
this direction. My belief is that the Congress would
accept an explicit numerical target for inflation in
the context of a reaffirmation of the Federal Reserve’s
responsibility for promoting full employment.
So both the political realities and the focus on
continuity require that an explicit numerical target
for inflation be implemented as part of a dual man-
date and be done in a way that does not undermine
the flexibility of monetary policy to respond to vari-
ous shocks or unusual circumstances. This is both
the only choice and the best direction.
WHY BOTHER?
The FOMC is already an implicit inflation tar-
geter; and policy has been successful in achieving
a low rate of inflation, while preserving flexibility
to pursue stabilization policy. As a result, there is
some understandable skepticism about the payoff
in terms of better policy or improved outcomes
from making the inflation target explicit. 
First, at the margin, an explicit inflation target
should contribute to anchoring inflation expecta-
tions, both by identifying the point at which the
public should put down the anchor and by estab-
lishing a consensus on the Committee about where
the anchor should be. I personally believe that an
explicit inflation target is more effective in anchoring
inflation expectations once the target has already
been achieved, rather than in lowering the cost of
initially achieving the target. 
Second, an explicit inflation target would also
ensure a consensus on the Committee about the
inflation rate members should be aiming at, ensuring
that everyone is pushing in the same direction with
respect to the inflation objective. This could, at the
margin, improve the coherence of the deliberations
and the policy outcomes. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the payoff from more coherent internal
deliberations could be achieved by having an inter-
nally acknowledged target and does not require that
the target be made public. However, in my view, it
would be difficult to sustain and inappropriate politi-
cally for the Committee to agree on a target internally
and not announce it publicly.
Third, the added transparency about monetary
policy might further enhance the ability of bond
market participants to anticipate the future course
of monetary policy, shortening the lags from policy
to outcomes, and thereby improving the effectiveness
of policy. There is, I believe, a synergy between
transparency and policy effectiveness; and, if so, the
adoption of an explicit numerical inflation target
will be a step toward a more effective monetary
policy, improving the partnering between monetary
policy and the bond market.
PROCESS
Part of the successful navigation through the
political process is to set up a well-structured process
of inside deliberation, outside consultation, and
Congressional oversight about both the general
direction and the details of the implementation. The
degree of acceptance of the direction will ultimately
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depend importantly on the details, including the
reaffirmation of the commitment to the dual man-
date, the precise level of the target, whether there
is a range or just a point, the timeframe over which
the FOMC would be judged about its compliance
with the target, and any reporting requirements
that accompanied the new regime.
Below, I set out a possible process for moving
toward an explicit numerical inflation target in the
United States.
1. The process should begin with internal discus-
sion. There has to be, at the outset, sufficient
support within the FOMC to justify a renewed
and intensified focus on the topic. The FOMC
then has to direct the staff to develop options
and implementation details. 
2. The staff should then revisit some of the
topics they have previously considered,
update some of the previous relevant studies,
including the work presented at the July 1996
and July 1997 FOMC meetings, and set out
options for implementation details.
3. The FOMC should then make a decision as
to whether they want to adopt an explicit
inflation target and set out a preliminary
proposal for implementation details. 
4. At this point, the Chairman should brief
Congressional leaders about the desire of
the FOMC to move in this direction and set
up a mutually agreed consultation process,
including hearings. An agreement would be
reached as to whether the inflation target was
to be adopted by the FOMC, in pursuance of
the existing Congressional mandate for price
stability, or whether the target was subject to
consideration and approval by the Congress.
5. The preliminary proposal should be released
to the public for comments.
6. After comments, a final proposal would be
released and, after further Congressional
consultations and perhaps hearings, would
be implemented.
OBSTACLES
The most obvious obstacle to establishing an
explicit numerical target for inflation is, of course,
Alan Greenspan. He has made it clear that he is
opposed to moving in this direction, though the
argument he made at a conference at this Bank—
specifically that he opposed an explicit target for
inflation because we could not measure inflation
precisely enough—was singularly disappointing
and uncompelling. No matter. The Chairman clearly
prefers the status quo for the remainder of his term,
and no one on the Committee, including myself
when I was there, would push to adopt an explicit
inflation target while he was at the helm. But when
the Chairman’s term is over in early 2006, the topic
will likely resurface and become an active one inside
and outside the FOMC. 
The second obstacle could be the new chairman.
The new chairman should presumably be given
some time to develop his own views on the topic
and will undoubtedly have a considerable influence
on whether the Committee moves in this direction.
On the other hand, I expect the Committee will be
looking to assert greater influence on policy out-
comes and directions for policy strategy, and the
momentum inside the Committee to at least give
this careful consideration is likely to be impossible
to contain.
The third obstacle is the politics of inflation
targeting. The irony is that it might take a chairman
with the clout and political savvy of Alan Greenspan
to navigate such a change through the political
process. I believe that the current legislative mandate
provides a legal basis for the Fed to adopt a numeri-
cal inflation target, as long as the FOMC continues
to accept the dual mandate. Nevertheless, adopting
an inflation target would be viewed as an important
change in the monetary policy regime and, as such,
would need to be vetted with the oversight com-
mittees in the Congress. While I do not believe that
new legislation is needed, the Fed would have to
ensure that the Congress was comfortable with this
direction.
The fourth is inertia. Members of the FOMC
undoubtedly believe, as I do, that the Committee
has conducted policy in a flexible yet disciplined
and effective manner over the past decade. There
is no perceived imperative to change the policy
regime. It could be argued that adopting a numeri-
cal inflation target is not fundamentally a change
in the regime, but the point is still “if it ain’t broke,
why fix it.”
The fifth obstacle is the challenge of building a
consensus for the change inside the FOMC and then
for the details of the change. To do so, it will be
necessary to meet head on the legitimate concerns
of some who have staked out positions against such
a direction. By the way, my basic procedural pro-
posal is to lock Governors Ben Bernanke and Don
Kohn in a room and not let them out until they have
 Meyer REVIEW
156 JULY/AUGUST 2004
reached an agreement. That agreement is one I am
sure I and the overwhelming majority of the Com-
mittee likely could accept. 
What is the core of the case against an inflation
target? Don Kohn, in my view, has presented the
most thoughtful argument against moving in this
direction. There may be a trade-off between becom-
ing more transparent and accountable by adopting
an explicit numerical inflation target and losing
some of the flexibility that the Committee has had
in the conduct of monetary policy.
My proposal—adopting an explicit numerical
inflation target in the context of a reaffirmation of
the Committee’s commitment to the dual mandate—
is designed to meet that concern by making clear
that the intention of the change was not to alter the
way in which monetary policy has been conducted,
but only to make that conduct more transparent
and accountable. 
Still, that concern lingers. It can perhaps be
appreciated in terms of the Taylor rule, viewed as a
simple summary of the way in which the FOMC
conducts monetary policy. The question then is
whether the FOMC can make explicit the numerical
target for the inflation objective—one of the key
terms on the Taylor rule—without, at the same time,
also altering the response coefficient on the output
gap relative to the response coefficient on the gap
between inflation and the inflation target. That is, can
the Committee more precisely identify one target
without changing the way it balances its two objec-
tives and the aggressiveness, in particular, with which
it responds to deviations in inflation from its target?
Perhaps even more to the point, does adopting
an explicit and numerical inflation target force
monetary policymakers to be more mechanical in
their conduct of monetary policy, as in following
more closely a Taylor rule, as opposed to having
the flexibility to deviate from the rule when circum-
stances encourage the Committee to do so?
I would not argue that this is a trivial question
and one without merit. Indeed, many who favor an
inflation target or a full-fledged inflation-targeting
regime do so precisely because such an approach
constrains discretion. It is noteworthy that in their
discussions of the policy framework, Governor
Bernanke’s highest praise goes to one which involves
“constrained discretion,” while Governor Kohn
reserves his highest praise for a policy that is flexible
and pragmatic. Of course, they both undoubtedly
see the merit in the attempt to achieve a balance
among these properties of a policy regime.
I do not believe that, under my proposal, there
would be much risk that monetary policy would lose
its current flexibility—but that would depend on how
the change was understood by the Committee, the
Congress, and the public. My recent experience
reinforces this point. I have recently talked to econ-
omists who often say that they oppose moving to
an inflation-targeting regime; when they heard my
proposal, however, they not only indicated that
they could support it but seemed at least modestly
enthusiastic about going in that direction. That
suggests that much of the opposition to an explicit
numerical inflation target is really opposition to
the hierarchical mandates and perceived practices
of so-called inflation-targeting regimes.
In any case, I believe that the Committee would
have to become comfortable that they could conduct
policy with the degree of flexibility they have in
recent years, while still adopting an explicit numeri-
cal inflation target.
The last obstacle to adopting an inflation target
is agreeing upon the details. As it is often said, the
devil is in the details. Even those who might support
some version of an inflation target might not be
able to agree on the details of such a regime. That
provides a good bridge to my last section, practical
problems with implementing an inflation target.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
I presume that the staff would be asked to come
up with some recommendations and perhaps
options for the various implementation details
required to develop a proposal for the adoption of
an explicit numerical inflation target. I will offer
my own views on how the various issues might be
resolved, identifying some potential deal busters,
but I would quite likely change my mind about some
of the details after reading the staff’s recommenda-
tions and hearing the comments both from members
of the Committee and outsiders who have been
focused on this topic.
What Price Index Should the Inflation
Target Be Based Upon?
I do not believe there is a definitive answer to
this question, but I also do not believe that the
answer is very important, assuming the choice is
between a broad production-based index, such as
the chain-weighted price index for gross domestic
product, or a broad-based consumption measure,
such as the consumer price index (CPI) or the per-
sonal consumption expenditures (PCE).
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I do not believe that economic theory establishes
whether a production- or a consumption-based
measure of inflation is better as a target. Empirical
analysis might reveal interesting differences in the
way that monetary policy would respond to shocks
under production- and consumption-based meas-
ures, and that analysis might help to make the deci-
sion. For example, the response of monetary policy
to changes in the price of oil would be more aggres-
sive under a consumption-based measure, although
that conclusion would be reversed if the target was
expressed in terms of a core measure of consumer
price inflation. 
Still, I expect, as with all other countries that have
an inflation target, the choice will be a consumption-
based measure, as these appear more widely under-
stood by the public. This is also the direction of the
discussion of this topic at FOMC meetings, specifi-
cally in July 1996.
This would leave us with a choice between the
CPI and PCE measures. I viewed this as a close call
up until the release of the chain version of the CPI.
The chain CPI inflation rate lined up much closer
to, and indeed very close to, the PCE measure. I
would therefore opt for the PCE measure. But I
wouldn’t be a fanatic about this choice. There are
times when I might, were I a member of the FOMC,
indicate that the Committee was putting somewhat
more attention on the CPI measure, as a result of
distortions believed to be affecting the PCE relative
to the CPI.
Should the Target Be Defined as
Applying Over a Specified Time Horizon?
The Congress and the public, as well as the
FOMC itself, are going to want to monitor the success
of the FOMC in achieving the target established for
inflation. 
First, the Committee should always refer to infla-
tion in terms of the 12-month inflation rate for the
measure it selects, and specifically not talk about
monthly or even quarterly inflation rates. All moni-
toring of FOMC performance relative to the target
should be focused on the 12-month rate.
Second, the Committee should emphasize that
it is focused on achieving the target over an interme-
diate term and will move only gradually to return
inflation to the target if a shock pushes inflation
away from the target, especially if it is pushed out-
side its monitoring range. 
Many inflation-targeting countries explicitly
interpret their inflation target as applying to the
intermediate term, typically out 11/2 to 2 years. This
is sometimes referred to as inflation-forecast target-
ing. Central banks often report their inflation fore-
cast over this horizon, and it is expected that such
forecasts will be lined up on the inflation target.
This approach creates a potential tension with
a dual mandate. Under such a regime, it is not appro-
priate to always be at the inflation target, just as it
would not be appropriate to always be at the point
of maximum sustainable employment. An example
would be that it would make sense for inflation to
be above the inflation target late in the expansion.
If inflation just rose to the target during expansions
and fell below the target in recessions, the average
inflation rate will be below the target. In addition,
the overall target might have to be set higher in this
case, to reduce the prospect of occasionally hitting
the zero nominal bound.
In my view, a good way to set the target would
be as an average over the business cycle. Of course,
taken literally, that would be an average inflation
target, with properties like a price level target, in
that past deviations from the inflation target would
not be forgiven, but might at least implicitly be
expected to be offset by deviations in the other
direction later.
Should the Target Be the Overall
Measure of Inflation or a Core
Measure of Inflation?
If the objective is viewed as the forecast for
inflation over the intermediate term, say 11/2 to 2
years out, then it does not matter very much, if at
all, whether the target is specified as overall or core
inflation. That is because any shock will have dissi-
pated by then, so the policy that would be consistent
with achieved overall and core inflation rates 2
years out would be very close, if not identical.
Still, the public and the Committee are going to
want to monitor inflation outcomes along the way
to determine whether the inflation performance is
broadly consistent with the target. In my judgment,
the core measure, by providing the best guidance
about expectations for overall and core inflation in
the future, is the better measure for monitoring how
the FOMC is doing relative to its inflation target. I
would prefer to use a core measure as the inflation
target itself because I believe that would reduce
possible confusion about how the Committee views
departures from the inflation target induced by
temporary supply shocks.
Still, the choice between core and overall meas-
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ures of inflation would make a difference in the
conduct of monetary policy, at least if policymakers
were responding to recent changes in inflation in
their decisions about the setting of the funds rate
target. As a result, the optimal response to price
shocks remains an important consideration in the
choice between core and overall inflation rates as
targets. If it is optimal to “look through” the direct
effects of a price shock, and only respond to the
extent that there are indirect effects that later raise
the core inflation rate, this might suggest a preference
for the core measure. On the other hand, the pre-
sumption that some portion of a price shock would
likely pass-through to the core may suggest the desir-
ability of some initial response to the direct effect.
Should the Target Be Set as a Point or
a Range, and, if a Range, Should There
Be a Special Focus on the Midpoint?
I prefer either a point target or a range with a
focus in the midpoint as the explicit target. This
would likely provide a better anchor for inflation
expectations and reduce the indecision in the mar-
kets when the central bank was at one end of the
range about whether or not the central bank would
look for an opportunity to move back to the middle.
That does leave the question of what the purpose
of a range is and how wide the range should be.
One purpose is to identify a range of variation that
is typical cyclically and would not be as strongly
resisted as when inflation moves outside the range.
That suggests a kind of nonlinear policy response
that could, in turn, be effective in limiting the vari-
ation of inflation expectations. The range might also
identify, for example, the upper limit to where the
Committee would be comfortable pursuing an
opportunistic disinflation strategy, and the lower
limit could identify the level below which policy
would be more focused on erring on the side of
ease, because of concerns about the possibility of
deflation or hitting the zero nominal bound.
Many inflation-targeting countries have chosen
a range of 1 percentage point, typically from 1
percent to 3 percent. Governor Bernanke has indi-
cated that he would like to see inflation within a 1-
percentage-point range, 1 percent to 2 percent.
Should the Inflation Target Be Set
Once and for All or Be Subject to
Adjustment?
The spirit of an inflation target is that it should
be set and remain in place for long periods, so as to
ensure economic agents that they can make longer-
run decisions with confidence about the average
inflation rate over such horizons.
But, while the target should not be changed
often, there should be a willingness to revisit the
target, on occasion, as evidence about the inflation
bias evolves and as research provides new informa-
tion about the appropriate size of the cushion rela-
tive to zero true inflation.
Should the Target Be a Price Level or
Inflation Target?
There has been considerable discussion about
the benefits of a price level rule for an economy
facing the danger of deflation. Similar benefits accrue
to a target for the average inflation rate over some
period, as long as there is a commitment to compen-
sating for periods when inflation is below the target
with periods where inflation is above the target. How-
ever, as I have suggested, the case for moving to an
explicit numerical inflation target is generally per-
ceived to be an attempt to preserve continuity in U.S.
monetary policy, not to provide an opportunity for
a significant change in the way in which that policy
is conducted. So I would not anticipate that an option
of a price level target would be seriously considered.
Should the Inflation Target Be Set for
True Price Stability or Price Stability
Plus a Cushion, and, if There Should
Be a Cushion, How Large Should It Be?
The FOMC considered this topic in considerable
detail at the first FOMC meeting I participated in, in
July 1996. Janet Yellen made the case for an inflation
target set high enough to both take into account
measurement error and also allow a cushion that
took into account the potential deterioration in
economic performance if inflation were too low.
She called for an inflation target of 2 percent and
everyone on the Committee lined up to state their
preference. The Chairman tried to get away with his
vague definition of price stability: “Price stability is
that state in which expected changes in the general
price level do not effectively alter business or house-
hold decisions.” But Yellen pressed him and asked
if he could put a number on that. Remarkably, the
Chairman agreed, and said he preferred zero infla-
tion, correctly measured. Janet asked if he could
settle for 2 percent incorrectly measured.
By the way, this is the only time during my 51/2
years on the Board and the FOMC that anyone was
able to extract from the Chairman a number related
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to his forecast, his estimate of productivity growth
or anything else—of course, other than his recom-
mendation each meeting for the federal funds rate
target.
During a go-around on the topic, only a few
Committee members preferred a target of zero, and
the consensus was very strong for a 2 percent infla-
tion target. The Chairman ended up summarizing
the discussion as “an agreement for 2%,” but then
cautioned Committee members not to reveal that
such a discussion even took place.
Interestingly, the Chairman asked toward the
end of the discussion to what measure of inflation
the 2 percent target should apply. Yellen indicated
she did not have a specific measure in mind, but
most of the Committee appeared to be thinking in
terms of the CPI, specifically the core CPI. Greenspan
argued that the PCE was the better measure of con-
sumer price inflation and that the target should be
set in terms of the best measure. He then pointed
out that while the core CPI was 21/2 percent, the core
PCE was already 2 percent, so that the Committee
could apparently declare victory.
Bob McTeer noted, however, that the specific
target depends on the specific measure. If the
Committee preferred 2 percent for the core CPI, the
consistent target for the core PCE would be 11/2
percent, given the recent differentials among the
measures. Interestingly, the Chairman’s apparent
acquiescence to a 2 percent target for the core PCE
would have left him with a higher target for inflation
than preferred by the rest of the Committee.
What if that discussion were opened up today?
Governor Bernanke has indicated his preference
for a target of 1 to 2 percent, presumably for the
PCE measure, in line with the spirit of the July
1996 meeting. But a lot has happened since then,
particularly experience in Japan with deflation and
in the United States with low inflation.
The lessons drawn from these experiences have
reinforced the wisdom of Yellen’s remarks in July
1996, specifically that inflation can be too low as
well as too high, and that monetary policymakers
need to raise inflation to its target when inflation
falls below the target, just as they need to lower
inflation when it rises above the target.
Indeed, the lessons from recent experience
suggest that policy should be asymmetric, in light
of the asymmetric risks associated with deflation
and the zero nominal bound. That is, policymakers
should be more aggressive raising inflation to its
target when it is initially too low than lowering it to
its target when it is initially too high.
An interesting question is whether the inflation
target should be set high enough so that policy-
makers could respond symmetrically to movements
in inflation above and below the target, except per-
haps in a small percentage of cases.
That suggests that consideration might be given,
for example, to a 11/2 percent or 2 percent target
for the core PCE.
Should Additional Reporting Require-
ments Accompany the Introduction of
an Explicit Numerical Inflation Target?
A feature of inflation-targeting regimes, in
additional to an explicit numerical inflation target
and a hierarchical mandate, is greater transparency
about the forecast and a greater focus on explaining
any departures from the target.
First, the FOMC should not issue a separate
“inflation report”—because that would be inconsis-
tent with the spirit of the dual mandate. The only
change relative to the Monetary Policy Report and
semi-annual testimony would be some explicit
commentary on the outcome for inflation relative
to the target, and, when inflation is outside the
monitoring range, why that occurred and how the
Committee viewed the process and timetable for a
return to an inflation rate inside the range.
Second, the FOMC forecast should explicitly
include whatever inflation measure the target is
based upon. Today, the FOMC provides its forecast
of the overall inflation rate for the PCE, while many,
including myself, believe that the Committee makes
its decisions based more on the core measure. If
the target is stated in terms of the core measure, it
should be included in the FOMC forecast.
Third, since the FOMC controls inflation over
the intermediate term, it would be useful if the FOMC
forecasts always went out at least 11/2 to 2 years.
The current practice is that the FOMC forecast in
late January or early February only extends through
the remainder of that year. This should be extended
for another year.
Fourth, it might be useful to increase the fre-
quency of FOMC forecasts from twice per year to
four times. Just as a picture is worth a thousand
words, a forecast can be more revealing than
speeches and testimonies.
Fifth, if there is more attention on the forecast,
the Committee should fine-tune the process by
which they are prepared by the individual Com-
mittee members. The forecasts are supposed to be
based on “appropriate” monetary policy, but the
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forecasts the staff provides the Committee are often
based on a constant nominal funds rate. The staff
should help the Committee members in the forecast
process by always providing them a forecast based
on a policy rule or an “optimal policy” simulation.
AN EXAMPLE OF AN EXPLICIT
NUMERICAL INFLATION TARGET
The FOMC will conduct policy in an effort to
achieve maximum sustainable employment and
price stability, where the latter is defined as an
inflation rate of 11/2 percent, measured by the core
PCE inflation rate. Given that the economy is subject
to shocks and business cycles, it will be impossible
for the Committee to achieve simultaneously both
objectives at each moment in time. The objective
for employment is to minimize the variance of
employment relative to its maximum sustainable
level. The objective for price stability is to achieve
an average for the rate of inflation as close as pos-
sible to the inflation target over the business cycle.
The inflation target is symmetric, as the Com-
mittee recognizes that inflation can be too low as
well as too high. Therefore, monetary policy would
be directed to raising inflation if it fell below the tar-
get and lowering inflation if it rose above the target.
The Committee has intentionally set the target
so as to provide some cushion to reduce the likeli-
hood that the economy could encounter deflation
or that the federal funds rate could reach the zero
nominal bound.
The Committee, in conducting its policy, finds
it useful to establish a monitoring range around the
inflation target of 1 to 2 percent. Movements within
the band represent cyclical variation in the inflation
rate that is acceptable to the Committee. Movements
outside this range would be of more concern and
would be more vigorously countered by monetary
policy, with appropriate consideration as to whether
the divergences were likely to be temporary or more
permanent, without the intervention of policy.
 